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WORKING PAPER TITLE  i  
Abstract 
This paper considers whether an equivalence scale implicit in transfer policy can be 
inferred from summary measures of reranking (whereby the rank order of pre-tax incomes 
is different from that of the post-tax distribution). It is conjectured that, if the government 
has a distributional objective and formulates tax policy with a view to equitable treatment 
of income units, then adopting the scale that is implicit in government transfer policy 
should identify only the reranking that has no equity foundation. This motivates the 
question: Is the incidence of reranking associated with a transfer system minimised by the 
equivalence scale that is implicit in the transfer system? The analysis presented in this 
paper suggests that the equivalence scale which minimises reranking, while not 
necessarily equal to the closest approximation to the one that is implicit in transfer policy, 
is nevertheless in its vicinity. 
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WP 02/## | 1 Introduction
The use of adult equivalent scales, to allow for non-income-relevant diﬀer-
ences between income units, is widespread in the empirical analysis of in-
equality. A wide variety of scales exists and it is known that they can have
substantial eﬀects on income distribution comparisons; see Coulter et al.
(1992b). While it is recognised that the choice of scales involves value judge-
ments, surprisingly little attention has been given to the question of the value
judgements implicit in the tax and transfer system. The aim of this paper
is to examine whether information about such judgements can be obtained
from the analysis of changes in the rank order of pre-tax incomes compared
with that of the post-tax-and-transfer distribution, referred to as reranking.
One explanation for the reranking observed in survey data is that the
order based on income gross of taxes and beneﬁts (pre-tax income) is ‘unfair’
because it fails to take into consideration the diﬀering ‘needs’ of a hetero-
geneous population. Most transfer systems adjust for household need by
basing tax and beneﬁtp a y m e n t so nt h en u m b e r ,a g ea n dh e a l t hs t a t u so f
household members, and these adjustments can aﬀect the post-tax order of
households. However, it is unlikely that all rank reversals are attributable
to an unfair distribution of pre-tax income.1 Reranking can also arise as
the result of government policy that is tangential to equity objectives. For
example, unemployment beneﬁts may be designed to encourage labour mar-
ket participation, or certain types of income may be treated diﬀerently on
eﬃciency grounds. Any reranking that arises as a result of these non-equity
based considerations is an issue of concern for studies that consider the re-
distributive eﬀects of taxation. This is because such reranking opposes the
extent to which a transfer system reduces inequality of pre-tax incomes, and
thus contradicts a progressivity objective.
Adult equivalent incomes are commonly used to focus on reranking that is
pe r c e i v e da sh a v i n gn oe q u i t yj u s t i ﬁcation (hereafter referred to as inequitable
1Shoup (1969, p.23) made a similar point in the context of unequal treatment of pre-tax
equals, or horizontal inequity. The relationship between horizontal inequity and reranking
is discussed in Section 2.
2reranking).2 This methodology requires the selection of an equivalence scale
that is used to adjust incomes for diﬀerences in unit need. Despite a consid-
erable research eﬀort, however, no compelling criteria have been identiﬁed
for selecting an equivalence scale. This problem is important for applied
studies of reranking because observed reranking typically depends upon the
equivalence scale adopted. Hence applied studies of reranking are commonly
criticised for failing to diﬀerentiate between reranking that is attributable to
assumed value judgements, and reranking that arises due to inequities of the
tax and beneﬁts y s t e m . 3
The question considered here is whether it is possible to infer a set of
equivalence scales that are implicit in tax and transfer policy, by identifying
the equivalence scale speciﬁcation that minimises observed reranking.4 Un-
like estimation methods that have been suggested elsewhere5, this approach
does not depend on an assumed tax function for reference units. It is based
on the premise that, if the government has a distributional objective and
formulates tax policy with a view to equitable treatment of income units,
then adopting a scale that is implicit in government transfer policy should
only identify inequitable reranking.
T h ec o n j e c t u r et h a tt h e r ee x i s t sas i n g l ee q u i v a l e n c es c a l ei m p l i c i ti n
transfer policy warrents some comment. Speciﬁcally, it is frequently assumed
that the adjustments made by ﬁscal policy for household heterogeneity de-
scribe a range of equivalence scales, rather than a single set of relativities.6
It is possible, however, to show that the equivalence scale framework is suﬃ-
ciently ﬂexible to describe any redistributive system (see, for example, Muell-
2For recent literature that considers reranking, see Creedy and van de Ven (2001),
Lambert and Ramos (1997a, b), Lerman and Yitzhaki (1995), Aronson et al. (1994), and
Jenkins (1988a).
3On the scepticism that is associated with measures of reranking due to the equivalence
scales assumed, see Lambert (2002, footnote 2).
4This suggestion was also mentioned brieﬂy in Creedy and van de Ven (2001). A
related issue concerns the aversion to inequality. Attempts to impute a value of inequality
aversion implicit in government tax decisions include Christiansen and Jansen (1978) and
Stern (1977); see also Mera (1969), Moreh (1981) and Brent (1984).
5See, for example, Muellbauer and van de Ven (2002a).
6See, for example, Coulter et al. (1992a).
3bauer and van de Ven, 2002b).7 In this paper we follow the methodology of
Muellbauer and van de Ven (2002a), and deﬁne the equivalence scale implicit
in transfer policy as the scale that minimises horizontal inequity.8
The issue of how reranking should be interpreted is discussed at greater
length in Section 2. This discussion is extended in Section 3, where a formal
model is used to identify the factors that determine the incidence of rerank-
ing. Section 4 considers whether the reranking observed for a transfer system
is indeed minimised by the equivalence scale that is implicit in the transfer
system. It is argued, based on a hypothetical population comprised of two
income unit types, that reranking need not be minimised by the equivalence
scale that is implicit in tax and beneﬁt policy. It is, however, conjectured
that, in practice, the scale that minimises reranking is likely to be closely
related to the scale that implicitly underlies transfer policy. To test this
conjecture, survey data are considered in Section 5.
Previous work on the role of equivalence scales in distributional anal-
yses has focused on inequality and poverty measurement.9 A study that
has examined the impact of equivalence scales on observed reranking is by
Nolan (1987). He expressed surprise on ﬁnding that adult equivalent income
showed more reranking than unadjusted incomes.10 T h eo b s e r v a t i o n sb a s e d
on survey data that are presented in Section 5 suggest that Nolan’s ﬁndings
(which appear to contradict the idea that an implicit equivalence scale can
be identiﬁed by minimising observed reranking) are attributable to the focus
of the equivalence scale that he used. Conclusions are in Section 6.
7See also Seneca and Taussig (1971).
8Horizontal equity requires ‘equal treatment of equals’. This is deﬁned by Muellbauer
and van de Ven (2002a) as the requirement that households with the same pre-tax equiv-
alent incomes should have the same post-tax equivalent incomes.
9See, for example, Buhmann et al. (1988), Coulter et al. (1992a, b), and Banks and
Johnson (1994).
10Nolan’s use of scales based on Supplementary Beneﬁt rates followed the Royal Com-
mission on the Distribution of Income and Wealth.
42 Interpretations of Reranking
The appropriate interpretation of reranking depends on the importance that
is assigned to the rank order of pre-tax incomes, which is reﬂected in al-
ternative views regarding distributive justice.11 In the absence of a widely
accepted principle of redistributive justice, some guidance may be obtained
by relating reranking to horizontal equity, which was described by Musgrave
(1959, p.160) as ‘perhaps the most widely accepted principle of equity in
taxation’. The relation between reranking and horizontal equity is deﬁned
here with the use of a simple analytical framework.
Assume that the redistributive objectives of tax policy designers are
framed in terms of income per equivalent adult. Values in adult equiva-
lent terms, as measured by the government, are denoted by a * superscript.
Let x∗
i and y∗
i deﬁne the pre-tax and post-tax equivalent income of unit i.
Given the distribution of x∗
i for a population, the government is considered
to impose an ‘equivalised tax function’, T (x∗





i − T (x
∗
i)+εi (1)
where εi allows for the possibility of horizontal inequity, and assume that
T0 (x∗) ≤ 1. This restriction prohibits an explicit reranking objective of gov-
ernment in terms of adult equivalent incomes: it was formulated by Feldstein
(1976), and adopted by Kakwani and Lambert (1998) as one of their three
axioms of equity in taxation.12
Add to this framework the following three assumptions. First, the popula-
tion is suﬃciently large such that there are several individuals with the same
pre-tax income as any other individual. Second, that the government speciﬁes
taxation policy to minimise the individual-speciﬁce ﬀect, εi. Third, suppose
the government’s objective is achieved on average such that E (εi)=0for
all i.
11For example, with a Rawlsian view involving a maximin strategy behind a ‘veil of
ignorance’, emphasis is on the minimum income level and no signiﬁcance is attached to
the rank order of incomes.
12Fei (1981) called this restriction ‘incentive preservation’, referring to the fact that an
individual who is subject to a marginal tax rate in excess of 100 per cent has an incentive
to reduce pre-tax income.
5Under these conditions, any reranking that arises must also be identiﬁed
as horizontal inequity. This conclusion, combined with the fact that precise
pre-tax equals are seldom observed in survey data, explains why many ap-
plied studies of horizontal inequity focus upon reranking.13 To consider the
interpretation of reranking it is consequently useful to focus on the concept
of horizontal equity.
Hence, if horizontal inequity is deemed to be undesirable under any view
of distributive justice, it is reasonable to suppose that the same can be said
for reranking, given the direct correspondence between the two concepts.14
However, this conclusion applies only to reranking that has no explicit equity
justiﬁcation. Furthermore, in practice it is important to weigh the undesir-
able implications of observed reranking against alternative issues of concern,
such as those mentioned in the introduction.
3 Equivalence Scales and Reranking
In terms of observed incomes, equation (1) translates to:15











To explore the sources of observed reranking, assume that the government’s





i − G (3)
where the same marginal tax rate, t<1, is applied to all income units
irrespective of their characteristics, and there is a single transfer payment,
13See the deﬁnition of horizontal equity suggested by Feldstein (1976, p.83), and Plotnick
(1985, p.241). Jenkins (1988b, p.308) refered to the ‘no-reranking’ condition as ‘strong
horizontal equity’, and the ‘equal-treatement-of-equals’ condition as ‘weak horizontal eq-
uity’.
14See Musgrave (1990) for a brief survey of the relationship between alternative con-
cepts of redistributive justice and horizontal equity. The concept of horizontal equity is
not universally accepted. Gordon (1972) suggested that the initial ordinal ranking of indi-
viduals merits no normative emphasis. Also, horizontal equity may not be satisﬁed by the
solution that maximises a utilitarian social welfare function (see, for example, Atkinson
and Stiglitz, 1980).
15The derivation of equation (2) assumes that the same equivalence scale is applicable
for pre-tax and post-tax income.








Assuming that εi =0for all i, and substituting equation (4) into (2), gives:
yi =( 1− t)xi + a
∗
iG (5)
Thus, for any two income units, A and B,f o rw h i c hxA <x B,r e r a n k i n go f
unequivalised incomes arises if yB <y A,t h a ti si f :








This reranking is a deliberate objective of transfer policy in response to a
value judgement regarding the ‘needs’ of the respective income units.
Suppose that an independent judge wishes to examine the redistributive
eﬀects of the transfer system deﬁned by equation (3) using an equivalence
scale ˜ ai instead of the government’s implicit scale. Use of ˜ ai implies that
pre-tax and post-tax equivalent incomes are related (assuming εi =0 )b y :





Hence, reranking may be observed unless ˜ ai is distributionally equivalent to
a∗
i,s u c ht h a ta∗
i/˜ ai is constant. Consider, for example, two income units, for
which ˜ xA < ˜ xB. From equation (7), reranking is observed (˜ yB < ˜ yA) if:











that is, if the diﬀerence between the post-tax beneﬁt derived from pre-tax
equivalent income by the two income units is more than oﬀset by the diﬀer-
ence between the equivalent transfer beneﬁts that arises due to the equiva-
lence scale used.
3.1 A Nonlinear Tax Function
Consider the implications for reranking of assuming an equivalence scale ˜ ai,
when the net eﬀect of taxes and beneﬁts is described by the generalised
7speciﬁcation of equation (1):















Assume that the government’s implicit scale and the scale adopted for anal-
ysis are related by:
a
∗
i =˜ ai + λi (10)
Substituting into equation (9) gives:
˜ yi =˜ xi −





˜ ai + λi
¶
−
(˜ ai + λi)
˜ ai
εi (11)
Suppose that the equivalised tax function can be described by an Nth order
polynomial (through a Taylor’s series expansion), so that:
˜ yi =˜ xi −







˜ ai + λi
¶j
−
(˜ ai + λi)
˜ ai
εi (12)
where βj (j =0 ,...,N)a r et a xf u n c t i o nc o e ﬃcients. Equation (12) can be
used to explore the eﬀects of variations in an equivalence scale that approx-
imates a∗
i.F o rt h ejth term of the tax function:

















































where the approximations assume small λi. Substituting for the tax function
terms in equation (12):




















εi + ψi (14)
8where ψi accounts for approximations made when deriving equation (13).
To explore the implications for reranking, consider the two income units
referred to above, for which ˜ xA < ˜ xB. From (14), reranking (˜ yB < ˜ yA) is
observed if:









































+(ψA − ψB) (15)
This result suggests the following conclusions regarding the sources of rerank-
ing. The disparity between the pre-tax equivalent incomes of income units
A and B tends to oppose the inequality condition required for reranking: as
the units move further apart in the pre-tax distribution ceteris paribus,i ti s
less likely that reranking will be observed.
The deduction made by the equivalent tax function for increases in pre-
tax equivalent income tends to support the inequality condition required for
reranking: the more severely the equivalent tax function treats income unit
B relative to A ceteris paribus, the more it is likely that reranking will be
observed.
Assuming that λi > −˜ ai for all i, the larger is εB relative to εA ceteris
paribus, the more it is likely that reranking will be observed. This obser-
vation, which relates to the relative severity of tax treatment for the two
income units, is consistent with the preceding paragraph.
The inﬂuence on reranking of the relation between the equivalence scale
adopted for analysis, ˜ ai, and the equivalence scale implicit in the transfer
system, a∗
i, depends upon elements of the equivalent tax function. When ³PN




= Γi > 0 for i =( A,B), λA tends to support,
while λB tends to oppose, the inequality condition required for reranking: the
smaller is ˜ aA relative to a∗
A, and the larger is ˜ aB relative to a∗
B, ceteris paribus,
the more likely reranking is to be observed. When Γi < 0 for i =( A,B), λA
tends to oppose, and λB tends to support the inequality condition required
for reranking. When Γi =0for i =( A,B), λA and λB have no eﬀect on the
9likelihood that reranking will be observed, ceteris paribus.
Observed reranking is therefore attributable to three principal factors,
in addition to the distribution of pre-tax income. These are: the struc-
tural speciﬁcation of the transfer system as described by T (x∗) in equa-
tion (11); the heteroscedastic application of the transfer system as described
by ε and; the disparity, λ, between the equivalence scale used for analysis
and the scale implicit in transfer policy. Furthermore, if the equivalence
scale adopted is distributionally equivalent to the scale implicit in the trans-
fer system (a∗
i = c˜ ai implies λi/˜ ai =( c − 1) for all i), (11) and (15) indicate
that observed reranking can arise only from the structural speciﬁcation of
the transfer system and/or its heteroscedastic application, neither of which
has an equity justiﬁcation.
4 Reranking and Implicit Equivalence Scales
This section considers whether observed reranking is minimised by the equiv-
alence scale implicit in transfer policy. The discussion is concerned with sum-
mary measures of reranking and while no reference is made to any particular
index, discussion focuses on two properties of reranking, incidence and in-
tensity. The ﬁrst property refers to the frequency of observed reranking in a
population, discussed in Section 3. The second property takes into consid-
eration the fact that more concern may be associated with reranking when
deviations between the pre-tax and post-tax distributions are large.
4.1 Minimising Observed Reranking
To consider whether reranking is minimised by the equivalence scale implicit
in transfer policy, begin by focusing upon two income units, A and B, subject
to scales ˜ aA and ˜ aB respectively. For any combination of strictly positive
pre-tax and post-tax incomes, it is always possible to specify the equivalence
scale, ˜ aA/˜ aB, such that reranking will not be observed between the respective




















































Figure 1: Reranking, Equivalence Scales and Population Subgroups
xA/xB or ˜ aA/˜ aB <y A/yB gives equivalised incomes:
xA
˜ aA










which maintain pre-tax ranks in the post-tax distribution. This conclusion
is independent of the relativities implicit in transfer policy, or the existence
of horizontal inequity. Hence, for a population of two income units, it is
possible that reranking is minimised by a range of equivalence scales that
may bear little relation to the relativities implicit in transfer policy.
It may be thought that this conclusion is relevant only for small pop-
ulations. However, it can be shown to apply more generally. Consider a
large population comprised of two subgroups, 1 and 2, within each of which
income units are considered to be homogenous, and hence subject to the
same equivalence scale. Altering the equivalence scale thus has no aﬀect on
the incidence of reranking within subgroups, but aﬀects reranking between
groups.
11The impact of equivalence scales on reranking for this population can be










2 .16 Similarly, the right hand axis of Panel A indicates the









2 for subgroup 2. There is an overlap between the pre-tax and
















. Any reranking between subgroups 1 and 2 must occur within the
dark shaded region deﬁned within these overlapping bounds. The trajectories
from the pre-tax to the post-tax income distribution of three income units









1 ), and units B and C are members of subgroup
2. Panel A indicates that reranking is observed between income units A and
B, and between units B and C.
Panel B illustrates the eﬀect on the respective distributions of equivalent
income if the equivalence scale reduces all incomes of subgroup 2 by 70 per
cent relative to the incomes of subgroup 1 (the distributions of pre-tax and
post-tax income depicted in Panels A and B hold subgroup 1 constant).
Comparing Panels B and A reveals that the region within which reranking
can be observed between the two subgroups is signiﬁcantly diminished after
the incomes of units in subgroup 2 are deﬂated.17 This is likely to aﬀect
reranking in two respects. First, between groups reranking may be aﬀected,
as is the case for the comparison between A and B when moving from Panel
A to B. In the extreme case, where the ranges of pre-tax and post-tax income
of each subgroup do not overlap, no reranking is observed between income
units of the diﬀerent subgroups. This eﬀect bears obvious similarities with
16In practice, it is likely that the equivalence scale used diﬀerentiates between many
more than two population subgroups. Furthermore, incomes within any given subgroup
are unlikely to be bound within the type of range displayed in Figure 1. However, it is
reasonable to interpret the ﬁgures as diﬀerentiating between one population subgroup and
all others. Also, the income bounds deﬁned in Figure 1 may be thought of as deﬁning the
range where the density of the respective population subgroups is highest.







must exhibit some reranking in Panel B, assuming that there is at least one
income unit in subgroup 1 with pre-tax income x
−
1 .
12the two-income-unit case examined earlier.
Secondly, the intensity of reranking relative to mean population income
is diminished in subgroups that are subject to larger equivalence scales, as
is observed for the reranking between units B and C when moving from
Panel A to B. Depending on the populations considered, these eﬀects may
evidently reduce reranking even if the scale considered is quite diﬀerent from
the relativities implicit in transfer policy. This statement can be made clear
by the following example. Suppose the income units of subgroup 1 are subject
to horizontally equitable tax burdens (so that no reranking is observed within
the subgroup), but those of subgroup 2 involve some horizontal inequity. In
this case, reranking of equivalised incomes can be minimised by applying an
inﬁnite equivalence scale to subgroup 2, which would omit reranking between
the subgroups (since x
−
1 > 0) and minimise the intensity of any reranking
observed within subgroup 2 (relative to average population income).
In Section 1 it was suggested that identifying the equivalence scale implicit
in transfer policy by minimising observed reranking could be useful because
it does not rely on the assumption of a particular tax function for reference
households. The analysis presented here reveals that omitting comparisons
with the reference unit tax function can lead to a signiﬁcant diﬀerence be-
tween the equivalence scale implicit in transfer policy and the scale that
minimises observed reranking. It is possible, for example, for reranking to
be minimised by a scale that shifts a subgroup of the population to a point
in the equivalised income distribution that is otherwise scarcely populated,
and also distorts the equivalised tax burden of the subgroup relative to the
remaining population. In short, the equivalence scale that minimises rerank-
ing can trade decreased reranking for increased horizontal inequity (as it is
deﬁned by Muellbauer and van de Ven, 2002a).
The equivalence scale that minimises the incidence of reranking does not
therefore necessarily coincide with the scale that is implicit in transfer policy.
However, it may be suggested that the two scales are related. Indeed, it may
be conjectured that the equivalence scale which minimises the incidence of
reranking, while not necessarily equal to the closest approximation to the one
that is implicit in transfer policy, is nevertheless in its vicinity. The above
13analysis suggests that this depends on the joint distributions of income and
subgroup characteristics. This is examined in the following section.
5 Analysis of Survey Data
This section uses survey data to consider the relationship between equivalence
scales and the reranking eﬀects of taxation. A brief description of the data
is given before presenting the empirical results.
5.1 The Data
The data were derived from the Conﬁdentialised Unit Record Files (CURFs)
of the 1997-1998 Survey of Income and Housing Costs (SIHC) for Australia,
and the Family Expenditure Survey (FES) for the UK. Both surveys pro-
vide income and demographic data for individuals and households. The
SIHC records annual household income measured in 1997 Australian dollars,
whereas the FES provides ‘normal’ measures of weekly income denominated
in 1997 British pounds. Both surveys attempt to account for all direct pecu-
niary ﬂows. For the analysis undertaken here, no attempt is made to impute
indirect taxes. The income unit adopted for analysis is the nuclear family,
which comprises a single adult or married (registered or de facto) couple and
any dependant children under the age of 17 years. After deleting income
units with inconsistent data, negative income gross of taxes and beneﬁts,
or non-positive income net of taxes and beneﬁts, the FES and SIHC were
reduced, respectively, to 6,803 and 8,451 households.
5.2 Empirical Results
Measures of household income were adjusted for family size and composition
using:
ai =( Φci + wi)
θ (17)
where ci and wi refer respectively to the number of children and adults in in-
come unit i,a n d0 ≤ (θ,Φ) ≤ 1.T h ec o e ﬃcient θ determines the economies
14of scale implied by the equivalence scale, and Φ indicates the eﬀect of chil-
dren relative to adults. The equivalence scale described by (17) is deﬁned
with reference to single adults with no dependant children, for whom ai =1
regardless of the parameter values adopted. The speciﬁcation assumes that
the parameters θ and Φ are independent of income.18 When calculating sum-
mary measures of reranking, measures of equivalent income were weighted
by the number of individuals in each household.
The analysis presented here focuses upon the Atkinson (1979)-Plotnick
(1981) summary measure of reranking, R.19 T h i sm e a s u r ei sa ﬀected by both
the incidence and intensity of reranking and captures the area between the
Lorenz curve and the concentration curve of the post-tax income distribution.
The Lorenz curve is obtained by ranking individuals according to post-tax
income, while the concentration curve orders individuals by pre-tax income.
Since the Gini coeﬃcient, Gy, measures the area between the Lorenz curve
and the 450 line of equality, and the concentration index Cy measures the area
between the concentration curve and the 450 line of equality, R is calculated
by:









cov (y,F (x)) (19b)
The variables x and y denote pre-tax and post-tax income respectively, F (.)
is the respective cumulative distribution function, cov(.) is the covariance
operator, and ¯ y is the arithmetic mean of y. When the ordering of individuals
by post-tax income is the same as the ordering by pre-tax income, F (y)=
F (x), Gy = Cy,a n dR =0 .
18This formulation was used by, for example, Cutler and Katz (1992), Banks and John-
son (1994), Jenkins and Cowell (1994), and Citro and Michael (1995). Furthermore, Buh-
mann et al. (1988) show, using a simpliﬁcation where children are given the same weight
as adults, that adjusting θ provides an approximation to a wide range of equivalence scales.
19For alternative summary indices of reranking see, for example, King (1983), Cowell
(1985), and Jenkins (1988b).
15The reranking measure, R, incorporates the same aggregation that is asso-
ciated with the Gini coeﬃcient. To explore diﬀerent value judgements associ-
ated with the aggregation, the analysis has been repeated using the extended
Gini coeﬃcient. Since similar results are obtained for all of the measures con-
sidered, the discussion presented below focuses upon the Atkinson-Plotnick
statistic, and results for alternative statistics are presented in Appendix A.
To obtain a detailed picture of the eﬀect on reranking of using diﬀerent
values of θ and Φ, the unit square including all combinations of θ and Φ
was divided into a grid of 31 intervals per coeﬃcient. Varying the equiva-
lence scales aﬀects redistribution, V , measured as the reduction of the Gini
coeﬃcient from the pre-tax to the post-tax equivalent income distribution.20
This eﬀect is not the focus of interest here, so the measures of reranking are
reported as percentages of redistribution. These percentages are plotted as
surface projections for the Australian and UK survey data in Figures 2 and 4
respectively. Figures 3 and 5 provide the associated topographic maps, which
divide the observed variation into ﬁfty equally spaced iso-reranking lines.
The surface plot and topographic map of Figures 2 and 3 indicate that
reranking based on the Australian data is highly dependent upon the param-
eter values selected for the equivalence scale. The Atkinson-Plotnick measure
of reranking ranges between 5.677 and 10.184 per cent of associated redis-
tribution. A similar range is observed for UK data, where R varies between
7.304 and 13.722 per cent of V .
Comparing Figures 2 and 3 with 4 and 5, indicates that data from the
two countries produce a similar proﬁle for the relation between reranking and
the equivalence scale parameters. In each case, the corners of the unit square
form local maxima, with an elongated basin around the minimum incidence
of reranking.21 Taking cross-sections with respect to the Φ axis of the proﬁles
of reranking indicates a U-shaped relationship with θ that is similar to the
ﬁndings for inequality and poverty statistics obtained by Banks and Johnson
20See, for example, Banks and Johnson (1994), for a consideration of the eﬀect of equiv-
alence scale parameters on inequality.
21The proﬁles are driven by variation in R rather than V : similar conclusions are
obtained when proﬁles of R rather than R/V are considered.
16Figure 2: Reranking by Equivalence Scale Parameters - Surface Proﬁle: Aus-
tralia
Figure 3: Reranking by Equivalence Scale Parameters - Topographic Map:
Australia
17Figure 4: Reranking by Equivalence Scale Parameters - Surface Proﬁle: UK
Figure 5: Reranking by Equivalence Scale Parameters - Topographic Map:
UK
18(1994) and Coulter et al. (1992b).22
The reranking minimising scale parameters may be compared with econo-
metric estimates of the scale implicit in transfer policy, based on the use of
an explicit tax function following Muellbauer and van de Ven (2002a). For
Australia, a quadratic polynomial equivalent tax function and a logarithmic

















Ti =e x p( e1 + e2xi) (21)
For the UK, a third-order polynomial with homoscedastic errors was found
to provide a better ﬁt for the tax function. The estimates are displayed in
Table 1.23


















std error (eqiv scale) 0.30261 0.09304
(0.0262) (0.0244)
R-Squared 0.94992 0.94422
Standard Errors in Parentheses
It can be seen that the equivalence scale parameters that minimise R/V
displayed in Figures 2 to 5 are in the vicinity of the estimates in Table 1,
22However, the results considered here correct for the eﬀect of the equivalence scale
relativities on inequality per se. Furthermore, unlike the proﬁles of inequality and poverty
reported by Banks and Johnson (1994), the proﬁles of reranking displayed in Figures 2 to
5 exhibit a global minimum with Φ > 0.
23The estimation method involved searching for parameter values that minimise devia-
tions from horizontal equity. Given a close association between reranking and horizontal
inequity, it is likely that the values also minimise observed reranking.
19although the diﬀerences are statistically signiﬁcant. However, the measures
of R/V associated with the regression estimates are within the 95 per cent
conﬁdence interval about the global minimum observed for R/V using both
Australian and UK data. For Australia, the R/V measure calculated at the
parameter estimates in Table 1 is equal to 5.728, and for the UK the respec-
tive R/V measure is equal to 7.520. These compare with a minimum R/V of
5.677 with a 95 per cent conﬁdence interval of 5.340-6.039 for Australia, and
a minimum of 7.304 with a 95 per cent conﬁdence interval of 6.945-7.719 for
the UK.24 These results suggest that the reranking-minimising equivalence
scales may provide a conservative basis for scales implicitly used by policy
makers.
Figures 4 and 5 for the UK also help to explain the observations re-
ported by Nolan (1987), who found more reranking for equivalised than
unequivalised incomes. Consideration of Figure 5 reveals that combina-
tions of θ and Φ on the upper-diagonal spanning between (θ =1 ,Φ ' 0.2)
to (θ ' 0.65,Φ =1 )are associated with a higher measure of R/V than the
value obtained when θ =0(for which the equivalence scale is unresponsive
to household size). The equivalence scale parameter combinations deﬁned
within this upper-diagonal consequently imply the same ordinal relation ob-
served by Nolan for equivalised and unequivalenced incomes. Hence, it is
p o s s i b l et oc o n c l u d et h a tt h er e s u l t sr e p o r t e db yN o l a na r ea t t r i b u t a b l et o
the speciﬁc relativities of the scale that he imposed, rather than a conclusion
that holds more generally.
The parameters that minimise R/V imply larger economies of scale (a
smaller value for θ) and a larger adjustment for children relative to adults (a
larger value of Φ) compared with the associated regression estimates for both
countries. This ﬁnding can be explained with reference to the analysis in Sec-
tions 3 and 4. The survey populations considered in Figures 2 to 5 can be
divided into three groups; income units for which a larger equivalence scale is
associated with the parameter estimates derived using the two-stage regres-
sion displayed in Table 1 (households comprised predominantly of adults),
24Standard errors were calculated using the Bias Corrected and Accelerated Bootstrap
following Efron and Tibshirani (1993).
20income units for which a larger equivalence scale is associated with the pa-
rameter values that minimise the incidence of reranking (households with
children), and income units for which the equivalence scale is unaﬀect by the
parameters adopted (reference households).
Australian and UK data reveal that the average pre-tax equivalent income
(adjusted by the scales associated with the regression estimates) of income
units in the ﬁrst of these three groups is greater than the average pre-tax
equivalent income in the second group ($24,648 compared with $10,261 for
Australia, and £ 269.04 compared with £78.36 for the UK). Thus, raising
equivalence scales above those from regression estimates for a subgroup of
income units that have, on average, low pre-tax equivalent incomes tends to
reduce the R/V observed, and vice versa for a subgroup of income units with
high pre-tax equivalent incomes.
Consider two representative individuals drawn from the ﬁrst and second
population subgroups referred to above, and denote them A and B respec-
tively. Let a∗ denote the equivalence scale deﬁned by the parameter estimates
in Table 1, and assume that the respective pre-tax incomes of A and B are




B. Suppose that the equivalence
scale used for analysis is ˜ a,w h e r e˜ aA >a ∗
A and ˜ aB <a ∗
B. Hence:




B < ˜ xB = xB/˜ aB (22)
The pre-tax equivalent incomes of A and B exhibit greater disparity based
on the equivalence scale ˜ a than on a∗. T h i ss u g g e s t si ti sl e s sl i k e l yt h a t
reranking is observed between A and B. Indeed, assuming that the marginal
rate of the equivalent tax function is strictly less than one, the left hand
side of equation (15) opposes the inequality condition required for reranking.
This is oﬀset by uncertainty regarding the eﬀe c to nt h er i g h th a n ds i d eo f
equation (15), which depends upon the equivalent tax function parameters
and the heteroscedastic application of taxation in addition to the alteration
considered for the equivalence scale. Assuming the same equivalence scale
is applicable for pre-tax and post-tax income, ˜ yA <y ∗
A and ˜ yB >y ∗
B,w h i c h
supports the conclusion that it is less likely that reranking between A and B is
observed using equivalence scale ˜ a than a∗. These eﬀects are consistent with
21the discussion in Section 4 regarding Figure 1, where the relative increase
considered for the equivalence scale of subgroup 2 resulted in the omission
of observed reranking between income units A and B and a reduced area in
which reranking between subgroups could occur.
6 Conclusions
R e r a n k i n gc a nh a v eas i g n i ﬁcant eﬀect on the progressivity achieved by a
tax-transfer system, and is closely related to concepts of equity and redis-
tributive justice. However, empirical analyses of reranking are typically sub-
ject to criticism on the basis of the value judgements that they exogenously
impose. This paper examined the implications for reranking of diﬀerent value
judgements regarding the needs of heterogeneous income units. It was con-
jectured that an appropriate estimation strategy for the equivalence scale
implicit in transfer policy is to seek the relativities that minimise rerank-
ing. This strategy does not require an assumed speciﬁcation for the tax
function of reference units. Analytical results showed that the equivalence
scale that minimises observed reranking can diﬀer from the scale that is
implicit in transfer policy. Nevertheless, analysis of survey data from Aus-
tralia and the UK revealed no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the minimum
measure of reranking, and the reranking observed for regression-based scales
that minimise horizontal inequity using an explicit tax function. Hence, the
reranking-minimising equivalence scales may provide a conservative basis for
scales implicitly used by policy makers.
The analysis presented here consequently provides the analyst with a
framework for selecting the parameters of a given equivalence scale speciﬁ-
cation. It does not, however, provide an adequate response to criticism that
observed reranking may be due to horizontal inequity ‘imposed from the
outside’; selection of an equivalence scale speciﬁc a t i o nc a nh a v ea ni m p o r -
tant eﬀect on the measures of reranking obtained. Clearly, the practitioner
must continue to exercise care when selecting an equivalence scale, and when
interpreting associated distributional observations.
22Appendix A: Alternative Reranking Measures
The reranking measure, R, incorporates the same aggregation that is as-
sociated with the Gini coeﬃcient. To explore diﬀerent value judgements
associated with the aggregation, the analysis that is presented in Section 5










where v>1 is a parameter that reﬂects aversion to inequality, and all other
terms retain their deﬁnitions from above. As v increases from 1 toward inﬁn-
ity, G(v) places a greater weight on the lower end of the income distribution.
A value of v =2is equivalent to the standard Gini coeﬃcient (which al-
locates the same weight to each income unit). The resulting topographical
plots, for alternative values of v for both Australia and the UK, are shown
below. Table 2 reports associated conﬁdence intervals.
Australia: v=4
25See Yitzhaki (1983) on the extended Gini coeﬃcient. See Lerman and Yitzhaki (1995)
for an analysis of reranking based on the extended Gini coeﬃcient.
23Australia: v=1.5
UK: v=4
24Table 2: Reranking and Alternative Inequality Aversion Parameters
Equiv scale Regress R/V Min R/V 95% Conﬁdence
Lower Upper
Australian Data
v =1 .5 4.006 3.975 3.737 4.224
v =4 .0 12.916 12.825 11.955 13.785
UK Data
v =1 .5 6.319 6.209 5.895 6.548
v =4 .0 11.487 11.173 10.501 11.940
UK: v=1.5
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